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Abstract 12 
Saltmarshes provide important services including flood control, climate regulation, and 13 
provisioning services when grazed by livestock for agriculture and conservation purposes. 14 
Grazing diminishes aboveground carbon, creating a trade-off between these two services. 15 
Furthermore, saltmarshes are threatened by overgrazing. To provide saltmarsh protection and 16 
ensure the continuing delivery of ecosystem services, there is a need to incentivise land 17 
managers to stock environmentally sensible densities. We therefore investigated the possibility 18 
of agri-environmental schemes and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) to compensate for 19 
lost livestock revenue under reduced grazing regimes and provide carbon sequestration and 20 
other benefits. This is the first study to consider the benefits arising from a potential carbon 21 
market to saltmarshes, although similar schemes exist for peatland and woodland. We 22 
calculated the net economic benefit (costs of livestock production are removed from revenue) 23 
to farmers obtained from a hectare of grazed saltmarsh under low (0.3 Livestock Units per 24 
hectare per year), moderate (0.6), high (1.0) and very high (2.0) stocking densities accounting 25 
for livestock revenue, carbon benefits, and agri-environmental subsidies. We repeated the 26 
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procedure considering additional benefits transferred from the literature in terms of 27 
provisioning, regulating and cultural ecosystem services provided by protected saltmarshes. 28 
The net benefits were assessed for a range of market carbon prices and social costs of carbon, 29 
e.g. the opportunity cost of carbon for society. Applying the model to Scottish saltmarshes we 30 
find that the current range of market prices could prompt transitions from high to moderate 31 
regimes in areas where livestock value is low, however break-even prices for transitions showed 32 
high spatial variability due to spatial variability in livestock values. In some areas of the West 33 
Highlands, the break-even carbon price is negative, indicating that the current agri-34 
environmental schemes are able to more than compensate for the lost revenue accruing to 35 
farmers by a reduced grazing density. However, in other areas, such as the Outer Hebrides, the 36 
break-even carbon price is positive. Private PES schemes or increased public subsidies should 37 
then be provided to generate net benefits. It is reasonable to infer that a pure carbon market may 38 
have limited scope in incentivising consumers to buy carbon services, especially in areas with 39 
limited local number of buyers and corporates of small size. Under this circumstance, a 40 
premium carbon market offering bundled ecosystem services may help reduce grazing pressure 41 
across a larger number of Scottish saltmarshes, thereby providing globally important climate 42 
regulation services and at the same time protecting sensitive habitats. 43 
Keywords 44 
Saltmarsh, grazing management, carbon sequestration, Payments for Ecosystem Services, 45 
private and social costs of carbon 46 
Highlights 47 
x Reduced grazing may generate additional ecosystem services in saltmarshes 48 
x Current agri-environmental schemes can compensate forgone low income 49 
x Carbon payments could reduce grazing pressure where opportunity costs are higher  50 
x High spatial variability in carbon price is required to compensate reduced stocking 51 
x Bundling carbon with other ecosystem services might facilitate reduced grazing 52 
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1. Introduction 53 
Saltmarshes are coastal habitats dominated by terrestrial plants that experience regular 54 
tidal inundation. They provide a wide range of ecosystem services including flood defence and 55 
wave attenuation (Pethick, 2002); water filtration and pollutant retention (Barbier et al., 2011); 56 
nutrient cycling (Burden et al., 2013); reservoirs for rare and specialist species (Jones et al., 57 
2011); nursery for fish (Laffaille et al., 2000); habitat for grazing livestock (Olsen et al., 2011); 58 
and blue carbon sequestration (Beaumont et al., 2014). Despite their importance, considerable 59 
human activity has involved land reclamation for agriculture and urban development (Burden 60 
et al., 2013). As a result, saltmarsh cover in the UK has declined by 15% since 1945 (Beaumont 61 
et al., 2014) and quality has deteriorated, thereby compromising the capacity of saltmarshes to 62 
adapt to future sea level rise and climate change (Jones et al., 2011). 63 
In recent years the UK has recognised the importance of protecting saltmarshes and 64 
taken steps towards their restoration, including landward retreat of coastal barriers and flooding 65 
of reclaimed land (Garbutt et al., 2006). There is general agreement that the value of ecosystem 66 
services thus restored far outweighs the cost of restoration, but unless these services are 67 
marketed there is a lack of finance for such restoration projects (Environment Bank, 2015). At 68 
the same time, there has been growing interest in creating novel markets to allow private 69 
investment in ecosystem service provision (Reed et al., 2013). One such option of finance is a 70 
scheme of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) (Kinzig et al., 2011; Natural Capital 71 
Committee, 2015).  72 
 PES schemes currently existing in the UK fall under the category of carbon 73 
sequestration under the Woodland Carbon Code for newly planted woodland (Forestry 74 
Commission, 2017) and carbon sequestration with bundled co-benefits under the Peatland Code 75 
for restored peatland (IUCN, 2015; Reed et al., 2013). These Codes provide the verification and 76 
accreditation rules replacing voluntary standards such as the Verified Carbon Standard that are 77 
often characterised by high transaction costs (Bonn et al., 2014). Different forms of markets for 78 
3 
 
peatlands are reported by Bonn et al. (2014) who classify different schemes according to the 79 
services paid, whether they are publically or privately funded, and whether they are 80 
international or regional in scope.  For example, the UK Peatland Code is a market based on 81 
corporate social responsibility (Bonn et al., 2014), covering restoration costs of peatland due to 82 
business potential investment. Other transactions are based on public money arising from agri-83 
environmental schemes on carbon emission reduction (Reed et al., 2014) justified on the basis 84 
of paying for the fullest possible range of ecosystem service benefits, although they are poorly 85 
quantified (Reed et al., 2014). The above mentioned PES applied to peatlands fall in the 86 
category of voluntary transactions (private for carbon markets, and government mediated for 87 
agri-environmental schemes) between providers and users of resource-use proxies rather than 88 
ecosystem services (which are difficult to measure)  and have the properties to show 89 
conditionality on specific agreed rules amongst parties (Wunder, 2015).   90 
There is no equivalent Code for saltmarshes, although a comparable small-scale scheme 91 
is underway in the Deben estuary where funds for services are designed to meet costs of 92 
restoring degraded saltmarsh (Environment Bank, 2015). Notably, the current UK action plan 93 
for saltmarsh protection does not take into account the value of carbon sequestration services 94 
but only the compensation of lost habitat and flood reduction benefits (Natural Capital 95 
Committee, 2015). The creation of new saltmarsh for flooding regulation is considered more 96 
valuable than managing sustainable agricultural practices of existing saltmarshes. However, 97 
considering the valuable service of climate regulation that saltmarshes provide in the face of 98 
current climate change threats, there is a potential to establish a PES market to help finance 99 
saltmarsh protection and ensure continuing services.  100 
Compared with other vegetated habitats, saltmarshes have a great carbon capture and 101 
storage capacity as a result of high primary productivity and tidal trapping of organic matter 102 
(Chmura et al., 2003). Saltmarshes in Scotland sequester an estimated 2.35-8.04 t CO2 ha-1  yr-1 103 
and have a total carbon stock of 569.7 t ha-1 (Beaumont et al., 2014). Unlike freshwater wetlands 104 
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which are often significant sources of methane, methane emissions from saltmarsh are 105 
negligible (Bridgham et al., 2006). Regular inundation promotes anoxic soils that delay 106 
decomposition, such that the carbon captured in saltmarsh soils is a long term sink (Yu and 107 
Chmura, 2010) well suited for targeting of a carbon emissions reduction market scheme. 108 
In addition to the carbon sequestration service they provide, saltmarshes in the UK are 109 
widely grazed for both agricultural purposes and as a conservation tool to enhance floral and 110 
faunal biodiversity (Bouchard et al., 2003). Grazing significantly influences vegetation 111 
structure and community composition (Yates et al., 2000), thus influencing the services 112 
provided. For example, biodiversity is generally maximized under a light grazing regime 113 
replicating a natural system of native duck and geese grazing which hosts a wide range of plant, 114 
invertebrate and bird species (Adnitt et al., 2007). Light grazing promotes reverse succession 115 
and greater species diversity; whereas, ungrazed and intensively grazed regimes tend to produce 116 
monocultures (Fleischner, 1994). 117 
The relationship between carbon sequestration and grazing on the other hand is quite 118 
complex, resulting from an interaction of stocking density, grazer type, saltmarsh zone, 119 
seasonality, and other abiotic parameters. Results from the few existing studies have been 120 
contradictory, perhaps exposing geographic differences or the overriding importance of abiotic 121 
factors. Grazed saltmarsh in Canada (Yu and Chmura, 2010) and the Netherlands (Elschot et 122 
al., 2015) had higher soil carbon contents than ungrazed sites while grazed saltmarsh in 123 
Denmark had lower soil organic matter content than ungrazed sites (Morris and Jensen, 1998). 124 
A large-scale study in England and Wales found grazing to reduce aboveground vegetation, but 125 
to provide relatively small effects on belowground carbon stores (Kingham, 2013). In addition, 126 
Kingham (2013) found that effects of grazing on above and belowground carbon stores were 127 
generally quite small compared to effects of abiotic factors. This is likely because changes in 128 
aboveground carbon stores take time to translate to changes in belowground carbon stores, and 129 
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mechanisms such as plant compensatory growth do not occur instantly in response to a stressor 130 
(Holland et al., 1996). 131 
In this study we investigate the use of livestock grazing as a management tool for 132 
saltmarsh climate regulation services, a concept familiar to terrestrial systems (Bhogal et al., 133 
2011; Ma et al., 2006), and the extent to which the monetary valuation of this service can be 134 
translated into a financial tool (PES). In contrast to traditional PES schemes implemented in 135 
woodland and peatland ecosystems which rely on habitat restoration and creation, the study 136 
scenario only involves changing land use. A PES scheme for carbon benefits would operate by 137 
compensating farmers for the revenue lost due to reducing stocking density. Providing an 138 
economic incentive to farmers who manage saltmarshes to reduce grazing pressure would not 139 
only help combat climate change, but ensure that the managers themselves have a vested 140 
interest in the protection of the saltmarsh, thus limiting the need for extensive regulation. 141 
Nonetheless, a relevant effort in monitoring would be required to show that a saltmarsh 142 
managed under a PES project is providing additional benefits compared to the baseline, and 143 
fast, reliable and economic tools (such as simple spreadsheet) to do it must be proposed. 144 
Grazing management is already widely used as a conservation tool (Bouchard et al., 2003) and 145 
is easily adapted to address saltmarsh carbon sequestration, as light levels of grazing have the 146 
dual benefit of enhancing biodiversity and minimising the loss of aboveground carbon (Adnitt 147 
et al., 2007; Yu and Chmura, 2010).  148 
The aim of this study is to assess the economic conditions or private economic benefits 149 
for saltmarsh agriculturists under a range of grazing regimes promoted by a PES scheme for 150 
above ground carbon emissions reduction and agri-environmental incentives subsidising 151 
reduced grazing pressure. Moreover, social benefits of saltmarshes protected by the SSSI 152 
scheme (Sites of Special Scientific Interest that best represent UK natural heritage in terms of 153 
flora, fauna, geology and geomorphology) are assessed through benefit transfer approach.  154 
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There are several reasons to consider a voluntary carbon PES for saltmarshes. For one, 155 
restoring and maintaining climate regulation services of saltmarshes can contribute to Scotland 156 
meeting carbon emission reduction targets laid out in the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009. 157 
At the same time, saltmarsh protection will help meet targets under the Habitats Directive (EC 158 
1992). This is the first study to investigate the use of grazing management in saltmarshes for 159 
the purpose of climate regulation services. While the scope is limited to Scotland, as data and 160 
values are specific to this country, the methodology are applicable to a wider context.  161 
The paper is structured in two parts: the first (methodology and results) illustrates the 162 
economic conditions under which the current voluntary carbon market prices may compensate 163 
the opportunity cost of reducing grazing and the social-economic benefits (quantified in 164 
monetary terms) arising from a bundle of ecosystem services (using a benefit transfer approach). 165 
The second part (discussions and conclusions) describes technical conditions under which a 166 
PES scheme can be applied to saltmarshes.  167 
2. Materials and Methods 168 
2.1 Study location  169 
 We use Scotland as a case study to explore the feasibility of a carbon market and to 170 
investigate geographic differences in associated opportunity costs. A recent survey of Scottish 171 
saltmarshes found that 39 of 249 saltmarsh sites were being overgrazed (Figure 1), and 166 172 
failed condition targets to achieve Favourable Condition under the Habitats Directive (Haynes, 173 
2016). One-hundred and twenty-three sites are currently designated as neither SSSI nor Special 174 
Areas of Conservation (SAC, from Habitat Directive 92/43/EEC), and it was in these sites that 175 
overgrazing was the biggest threat. Non-designated saltmarshes are located mainly on the west 176 
coast and offshore islands where enforcement of proper grazing management can be difficult 177 
(Haynes, 2016), and it is in these areas where innovative, non-traditional financing mechanisms 178 
can be explored to verify additionality to protection. 179 
FIGURE 1 180 
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2.2 General methodological approach  181 
To quantify the private economic benefit (money that accrues to farmers) obtained from 182 
a hectare of grazed saltmarsh under different grazing regimes, different livestock stocking 183 
densities ranging from high intensity agricultural use to minimal grazing enhancing biodiversity 184 
and carbon sequestration services are used. The set of benefits chosen account for livestock 185 
grazing revenue, carbon benefits, and ad-hoc agri-environmental subsidies for reducing 186 
livestock pressures. To make the results applicable to the real world, a range of market carbon 187 
prices are used to perform a sensitivity analysis of how benefits change according to different 188 
prices. The services with their relative methodology of valuation are described in the following 189 
section. Moreover, social economic benefits from reduced carbon emission are proposed by 190 
using social costs of carbon instead of carbon market prices. Subsequently, other benefits 191 
quantified as willingness to pay for provisioning, regulating and cultural services ecosystem 192 
services provided by SSSI protected saltmarshes are considered. The latter are benefits 193 
transferred by previous research carried out in the UK (Christie and Rayment, 2012) following 194 
a procedure described in section 2.3.4.  Finally, section 2.3.5 describes how to calculate the net 195 
present value of the total services and  the break-even carbon price required to compensate for 196 
the loss in agricultural revenue, and whether there are geographic differences across Scotland 197 
associated with the opportunity costs of livestock.  198 
2.3 Methods for calculation of benefits from saltmarshes  199 
2.3.1 Livestock benefits  200 
We use livestock prices to calculate profits and opportunity costs associated with 201 
changing stocking density. Prices are taken from the June 2016 census of the Scottish 202 
agriculture report (RESAS, 2016) provided by the Agricultural Census Analysis Team. The 203 
census gives some data on a national level and some data on agricultural parish level. Parishes 204 
are geographical units based on Civil Parishes abolished in 1975 which continue to be used for 205 
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statistical purposes and for the payment of farming grants and subsidies ³$JULFXOWXUDO 3DULVKHV´206 
2017).  207 
Information provided at national level includes standard output (SO), e.g. the average 208 
monetary value (farm-gate worth) in GBP (£) of livestock converted in Table S1 to SO per 209 
livestock unit (SO LU-1) by dividing by LU of the livestock type (Chapman, 2007). LU is a 210 
reference unit based on feed requirements, where 1 LU is equivalent to an adult dairy cow 211 
³*ORVVDU\/LYHVWRFNXQLW/68´, and allows easier analysis of stocking density than 212 
if animals are considered by head. However, the absence of information on the real composition 213 
(number of units) of the herds at national scale does not allow the computation of the weighted 214 
average SO per livestock. To provide the net benefit per head of livestock (e.g. taking the full 215 
cost of production into consideration), information from Table B4 of RESAS (2016), reporting 216 
income, costs, profits and number of heads of livestock at farm level, is used1. Finally, the net 217 
benefit per LU is obtained dividing the net benefit by 0.67, the arithmetic mean of the LU of 218 
six types of cattle assuming an equal proportion of each type thereby giving the average LU of 219 
cattle per hectare, and by 0.12 in the case of sheep, the arithmetic mean of the LU of two types 220 
sheep (Table S1).  221 
To provide valuation per parish, we requested livestock units for the parishes of interest 222 
to RESAS. The proposed SO LU-1 per parish is a combination of cattle and sheep reflecting 223 
their proportion in that parish. Therefore, parishes containing a higher proportion of costly 224 
livestock have a higher SO LU-1. Although parish SO LU-1 should be in the same range as 225 
national SO LU-1 (Table S1), preliminary analysis revealed for several parishes unrealistically 226 
high values. This could be due to errors during census compilation or because unlisted 227 
                                                 
1
 Looking at Less Favoured Areas (LFA) cattle farming, the average cost per cattle in Scotland is £569, while 
outcome or standard outputs is £475. Taking into account common agricultural policy subsidies (pillar 1 and 2), 
the outcome raise to £ 683. Under this circumstance, the net benefit becomes £ 114 per cattle. Subsidies are 
equal to £208 per cattle. Looking at the LFA sheep farming, average cost per sheep is £125, and revenue is £ 69 
per sheep. Including CAP subsidies, revenues raises up to £150 per sheep. The net benefit of a sheep 
(considering subsidies) is £25. Subsidies are in this case equal to £ 81 per sheep.  
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agricultural outputs are being counted. We therefore decided to exclude parishes from analysis 228 
where calculated total SO differed by more than 50% from reported total SO, resulting in an 229 
analysis of 104 rather than 174 parishes. As with sheep only and cattle only scenarios we 230 
subtract the cost of inputs, calculated based on the proportion of each livestock type, for each 231 
to obtain net benefits from livestock.  232 
Two sets of livestock prices are then used to calculate benefits from livestock: (i) the 233 
net national average SO LU-1, split into exclusive cattle or sheep (Table S1) that do not provide 234 
any geographic information; and (ii) the SO LU-1 per parish, which account for the relative 235 
abundance of livestock in each parish that does expose geographic differences (Table S3). The 236 
different grazing regimes compared in this research are essentially a range of stocking densities 237 
expressed in terms of LU per hectare (ha). A guideline of average annual stocking rates for 238 
semi-natural habitats suggests grazing in saltmarsh in the range of 0.25-0.50 LU ha-1 yr-1 239 
(Chapman, 2007). In accordance with scales employed by Kingham (2013), we assess carbon 240 
benefits for four levels of grazing: low (0.3 LU ha-1 yr-1), moderate (0.6 LU ha-1 yr-1), high (1.0 241 
LU ha-1 yr-1), and very high (2.0 LU ha-1 yr-1).  242 
2.3.2 Carbon benefits 243 
 To calculate carbon benefits, the quantification of how changing grazing pressure 244 
affects saltmarsh carbon stocks is needed. Kingham (2013) found that aboveground plant 245 
biomass decreased by 2.1 t ha-1 LU-1 across high, mid, low and pioneer saltmarsh in north Wales 246 
and north-west England. Plant biomass is converted to carbon given that plants almost always 247 
contain between 45-50% carbon (Magnussen and Reed, 2004). Multiplying by an average of 248 
47.5%, this gives a reduction of aboveground carbon content due to grazing of 0.998 t C ha-1 249 
LU-1. We use data from England and Wales (not having more specific data from Scotland) to 250 
estimate these effects due to a lack of equivalent studies in Scotland, even though we expect 251 
spatial variability. 252 
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Additionally, an important component of the carbon budget to consider is the 253 
greenhouse gas emissions of livestock itself. Cattle and sheep emit significant amounts of 254 
methane, a greenhouse gas 25 times more potent than carbon dioxide, through enteric 255 
fermentation (Table S2; Brown et al., 2016). The carbon benefits thus consider two carbon 256 
sources: (i) decreased aboveground carbon due to grazing of saltmarsh vegetation, and (ii) 257 
carbon equivalent methane emissions of livestock. The carbon flux is then multiplied by market 258 
price or social cost of carbon to obtain carbon benefits. 259 
Market prices of carbon in the EU Emissions Trading System have been in the range of 260 
£3-£25 t-1 C since 2007 and below £10 for the past five years (Marcu et al., 2016). Rather than 261 
testing a single market price, we perform a sensitivity analysis using four prices (£1 t-1 C, £2 t-262 
1
 C, £5 t-1 C, and £10 t-1 C) each at four discount rates (3%, 5%, 10%, and 15%). While market 263 
prices are paid to ecosystem service providers in a carbon emissions trading scheme, an 264 
alternative way of valuing carbon benefits is to consider the social cost of carbon (SCC). SCC 265 
refers to the economic damages incurred by emitting one tonne of carbon and is a cost taken on 266 
by society. If caps ensured efficient carbon removal levels, then market price and SCC would 267 
be the same (Nordhaus, 2017). A range of social costs at respective discount rates indicative of 268 
the current literature are considered (£8.04 t-1 C at 5%, £23.38 t-1 C at 3%, £37.26 t-1 C at 2.5%, 269 
and £65.76 t-1 C at 3%) (Nordhaus, 2017; Tol, 2009; van den Bergh and Botzen, 2014). 270 
2.3.3 Agri-environmental subsidy 271 
The UK Agri-Environment Climate Scheme compensates farmers providing 272 
environmental public goods under Pillar II of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (Reed et al., 273 
2014). In particular, the Wetland Management Option rewards farmers who manage 274 
saltmarshes to benefit faunal and floral biodiversity with  £90.03 ha-1 year-1 ³:HWODQG275 
0DQDJHPHQW´ . Although the scheme does not currently consider the carbon 276 
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sequestration service of saltmarshes, reducing grazing pressure to benefit biodiversity 277 
incidentally ensures that more aboveground carbon is maintained (Kingham, 2013).  278 
A requirement for farmers managing a site is to have an approved grazing regime 279 
individualised for each site depending on site-specific conditions. Owing to this, there is no set 280 
guideline LU ha-1 density below which a site qualifies. Stocking densities can also vary 281 
seasonally, for example to minimise conflict with wading birds during breeding season 282 
(Bouchard et al., 2003). We make the simplifying assumption that, of our four regimes, low and 283 
moderate grazing qualify for the scheme. Several studies have shown that low and moderate 284 
grazing increases biodiversity (Bouchard et al., 2003; Fleischner, 1994; Marty, 2005; Norris et 285 
al., 1998), suggesting the assumption is reasonable. 286 
2.3.4 Valuation of other saltmarsh ecosystem services 287 
Saltmarshes provide additional services on top of the provisioning service of livestock 288 
grazing and the regulating service of carbon sequestration. Using a series of choice experiments, 289 
Christie and Rayment (2012) determined that the public (sample from England and Wales) is 290 
willing to pay £450 ha-1 year-1 to secure services currently delivered by SSSI conservation 291 
activities in coastal grazing marsh in England and Wales. These services LQFOXGHQDWXUH¶VJLIWV2, 292 
research and education, climate regulation, water regulation, sense of experience, charismatic 293 
species, and non-charismatic species. Excluding climate regulation (to avoid double counting) 294 
and water regulation (the degree of which depends on the size of the site) this corresponds to 295 
£375.13 ha-1 to secure the remaining services. This value is corrected for Scotland applying a 296 
willingness to pay transfer with adjustment for income elasticity as given in Pearce et al. (2006): 297 ܹܶ ௌܲ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗ ൌ ܹܶ ாܲ௡௚௟௔௡ௗାௐ௔௟௘௦ሺ ௌܻ௖௢௧௟௔௡ௗȀ ாܻ௡௚௟௔௡ௗାௐ௔௟௘௦ሻ௘          (1) 298 
                                                 
2
 In Christie and Rayment (2012) QDWXUH¶VJLIWVPDLQO\QDWXUDOVSRQWDQHRXVSURGXFWVRIODQGDre 
comprehending several provisioning services described also by other ecosystem services approaches (MEA, 
2005; TEEB, 2010; CICES, 2018), but do not include livestock grazing, while more recently the literature (see 
Diaz et al., 2018) see them as synonym of ecosystem services.  
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where WTP is the willingness to pay; Y is the gross annual pay for employees in England and 299 
Wales (£23,426) and Scotland (£22,918) (Aiton, 2016); and e is the income elasticity estimated 300 
at 1.3 for British households (Layard et al., 2008). This corresponds to a WTP of £364.58 ha-1 301 
in Scotland. 302 
While this value applies to services delivered by SSSI sites, only 49% of Scottish 303 
saltmarshes are under such designation. However, in both designated and non-designated sites, 304 
grazing is a common tool used to ensure the conservation services of saltmarshes, and where 305 
conservation is prioritized, light grazing is preferred as it gives greatest structural and biological 306 
diversity (Adnitt et al., 2007; Chatters, 2004). We therefore assume that sites managed under 307 
the more stringent low regime warrant the same delivery of services as SSSI designated sites. 308 
It is important to remember that moderate grazing still increases biodiversity compared to high 309 
and ungrazed systems, which is why we include it in qualifying for subsidy, but it is not the 310 
preferred option when conservation is the main goal.  311 
2.3.5 Calculating benefit and break-even carbon prices 312 
We determine the benefit from land use of a hectare of saltmarsh as:  313 ܰܤሺݐሻ ൌ ܤ௅ሺݐሻ െ ܤ஼ሺݐሻ ൅ ܤௌሺݐሻ ൅ ܤ௏ሺݐሻ           (2) 314 
where BL(t) denotes revenue from livestock minus depreciation cost; BC(t) is the carbon benefit 315 
lost due to plant biomass reduction and livestock emissions; BS(t) is the subsidy gained from 316 
agri-environmental schemes; and BV(t) is the valuation of other saltmarsh services. We do not 317 
mix measures of private and public benefits in the analysis: we only include BV(t) when 318 
assessing the social benefits of carbon reduction through the social costs of carbon, as WTP is 319 
an economic measure of public preferences for social benefits provided by saltmarsh services 320 
rather than a payment at the current market price.  321 
 We then calculate the benefits over a period of 30 years by discounting them into net 322 
present value with the formula: 323 
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 ൌ ෍ ே஻ሺ௧ሻሺଵା௜ሻ೟௧்ୀ଴                 (3) 324 
where t is time and i are the discount rates chosen to reflect a range of social preferences to high 325 
rate of return achievable in agriculture (3%, 5%, 10%, and 15% for market prices, 2.5%, 3%, 326 
and 5% for social costs, see section 2.4). We employ a timeframe of 30 years rather than a 327 
longer one, as a scheme involving grazing management does not need to rebuild carbon in soil, 328 
as happens for drastic changes in planting systems, but rather affects changes in aboveground 329 
carbon which are faster (Palmer and Silber, 2012).  330 
In addition to the net benefit, we calculate the break-even carbon price required to 331 
compensate the foregone revenue from livestock and subsidy at different stocking densities. 332 
The break-even carbon price will differ depending on the specific change in regime, such that 333 
we end up with six prices for six permutations of regime changes: moderate to low, high to low, 334 
very high to low, high to moderate, very high to moderate and very high to high. 335 
 Lastly, we compare how changes in benefits and break-even carbon prices differ across 336 
Scottish parishes. The break-even price relates to the livestock value (SO LU-1) we calculated 337 
per parish (reflecting the real composition of the herd), as the price of carbon to offset loss 338 
would need to be higher the more revenue can be gained from livestock. To visualise which of 339 
the 174 parishes containing saltmarsh (Figure 1) have higher costs, we map changes in net 340 
benefits and break-even carbon prices per parish using ArcGIS 10.4. 341 
3. Results 342 
3.1 Carbon benefits 343 
 Carbon benefits over 30 years for various market carbon prices and discount rate for 1 344 
LU ha-1 yr-1 are shown in Table 1. These represent the monetary value of (i) carbon emission 345 
avoided and (ii) the methane equivalent carbon emission avoided by livestock if grazing 346 
intensity is reduced by 1 LU ha-1 yr-1. It is possible to estimate relative values as arising from 347 
changes in grazing regimes from the difference in benefits when transitioning from one regime 348 
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to another. For example, the carbon benefits lost under a very high regime (2 LU ha-1 yr-1) are 349 
the benefits in Table 1 multiplied by two, as the grazing intensity is twice as high. Thus, a 350 
transition from a very high to high grazing regime will result in carbon benefits equivalent to 351 
the values presented in Table 1. Insofar as these values represent the amount of money 352 
generated if a carbon market provided payments for reduced emissions due to reduction from 353 
very high to high grazing regime, these carbon benefits are quite low. 354 
TABLE 1 355 
Within each discount rate bracket, there is a linear relationship between carbon benefits 356 
and carbon price. Thus, the benefits lost for a carbon price of £10 t-1 C are ten times higher than 357 
the benefits lost for a carbon price of £1 t-1 C. As we would expect, the greater the carbon price, 358 
the greater the benefits lost. Cattle grazing incurred slightly higher carbon loss as 1 LU of cattle 359 
emits 51% more methane than 1 LU of sheep (Table S2). Notably, the benefits lost for cattle 360 
are only around 13% higher than sheep, since carbon lost due to reduction in vegetation is 361 
greater than the carbon emitted by livestock (see Section 2.4).  362 
 The carbon benefits lost using social costs of carbon (Table 2) were higher than when 363 
using market prices, which we expect given that the social costs we used were greater. Once 364 
again, the carbon benefits lost were higher when saltmarshes were grazed exclusively by cattle 365 
rather than sheep, as the former emit greater amounts of methane.  366 
TABLE 2 367 
3.2 Change in net benefits when altering grazing regimes 368 
Table 3 illustrates how reductions in grazing regimes result in either loss or gain of net 369 
economic benefit from a hectare of saltmarsh over a period of 30 years. For a majority of cases 370 
where sheep and cattle grazing intensity is reduced from a higher regime to a lower regime, 371 
land managers can expect to lose money under the current range of market carbon prices (Table 372 
3). This is because the value of carbon benefits lost at higher stocking density is much lower 373 
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than the revenue gained from livestock. The greatest losses are incurred under a transition from 374 
very high to low regimes, as this is when the greatest change in stocking density occurs at a 375 
reduction of 1.7 LU ha-1 yr-1. The reduction in net benefit is lower with higher carbon prices, as 376 
these equate to higher carbon benefits to offset revenue loss. 377 
TABLE 3 378 
However, in cases where the transition in sheep and cattle grazing is from high to 379 
moderate, land managers could actually gain net benefit (Table 3). According to these results, 380 
there is an economic incentive to reduce to a moderate grazing regime if grazing is currently on 381 
a high regime. The reason for this is that under our current study assumptions such a change 382 
allows a saltmarsh site to qualify for an additional £90.03 ha-1 year-1 from the Wetland 383 
Management subsidy. The income from subsidy and carbon benefits is sufficient to offset the 384 
loss in revenue arising from a reduction in grazing of 0.4 LU ha-1 yr-1, the difference between 385 
high and moderate regimes. 386 
 On the other hand, when we use social costs of carbon to assess changes in net benefits 387 
of different grazing regimes, there are more instances where it is economically feasible to 388 
reduce grazing pressure (Table 4). Without additional bundled ecosystem service co-benefits, 389 
decreasing grazing pressure is profitable under a high to moderate transition as before. When 390 
we include other benefits (valued at £364.58 ha-1 ) to take into account the broad range of 391 
ecosystem services provided by protected SSSI sites, benefits increase under all transitions 392 
except very high to high and very high to moderate, although not under very high to moderate 393 
for cattle at highest social costs of carbon. 394 
TABLE 4  395 
3.3 Livestock opportunity costs 396 
 Examining the transition from high to moderate stocking density further, as this is the 397 
most favourable transition having the lowest opportunity cost and greatest increase in net 398 
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benefit (Tables 3 and 4), the loss in livestock revenue that is incurred each year is given in Table 399 
5. The figures represent the amount of money farmers would lose for reducing stocking density 400 
by 0.4 LU ha-1 yr-1. Conversely, this is also the amount of compensation needed to incentivise 401 
a reduction in grazing pressure, whether provided through ecosystem service benefits or 402 
subsidiary aid.  403 
TABLE 5 404 
3.4 Break-even carbon prices 405 
 Break-even carbon prices were overall higher for sheep than for cattle (Table 6), as the 406 
former are more valuable when considered per livestock unit. Negative break-even price 407 
occurred under a transition from high to moderate sheep and cattle stocking densities, as sites 408 
then qualified for the additional £90.03 ha-1 compensation scheme which drove down the 409 
required carbon benefit to offset loss of agricultural revenue. The fact that these values are 410 
negative indicates that land managers are better off under the less intense regimes. In other 411 
cases, the positive break-even prices indicate the market price that carbon would have to be at 412 
to incentivise managers to reduce stocking density. The range of positive carbon prices in Table 413 
6 are higher than the range of market prices we explored, but comparable to the range of social 414 
costs of carbon indicative of the literature. Therefore, if carbon removal levels were efficient 415 
and offset occurred at the full social cost, these would be sufficient to prompt a decrease in 416 
grazing pressure. The highest break-even prices occurred under a transition from moderate to 417 
low and very high to high stocking densities (Table 6). The prices of these two transitions are 418 
identical because both involve halving of stocking density and no addition or removal of 419 
subsidy. 420 
TABLE 6 421 
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3.5 Geographic differences in opportunity costs 422 
 The calculated livestock value (standard output) per parish, under a composition of 423 
livestock in each parish as given in the agricultural census and accounting for cost for 104 424 
parishes containing saltmarsh ranged from £112.68 LU-1 in Stenness to £1,527.70 LU-1 in 425 
Monkton & Prestwick3 (Table S3). The big range between these values is determined mainly 426 
by the different compositions of herds. In some parishes, mainly in the lowlands, the presence 427 
of a high number of highly valuable resources causes the SO to be very high. 428 
Transitioning from high to low stocking density at a carbon price of £1 t-1 C and 5% 429 
discount rate resulted in gain of net benefit in 4 out of 104 parishes (Figure 2), and 7 out of 104 430 
at a higher price of £10 t-1 C (Figure S1). Thus, the range of market carbon prices we explore 431 
could potentially prompt reductions in select parishes with low value livestock. 432 
FIGURE 2 433 
Transitioning from high to moderate regimes instead, the number of parishes with 434 
benefit gains increases. At carbon price of £1 t-1 C and 5% discount rate with real herd 435 
compositions, 42 out of 104 parishes showed gains in net benefit (Figure 3). Considering the 436 
upper limit of market carbon prices of £10 t-1 C, 46 of the 104 parishes show gains in net benefit 437 
(Figure S2). 438 
FIGURE 3 439 
At the same time, we consider the required price of market carbon to induce reductions 440 
in stocking of parish herds from high to low (Figure 4) and high to moderate (Figure 5) 441 
transitions, the same scenarios considered in Figures 2 and 3. For high to low transitions, break-442 
even price ranged from £-10.97 t-1 C to £963.53 t-1 C across parishes. For high to moderate 443 
transitions, which were also the most favourable transitions with lowest break-even price, price 444 
ranged from £-77.40 t-1 C to £897.10 t-1 C. As before, while negative carbon prices make little 445 
                                                 
3
 Differences in values are given by the different composition of livestock across the regions  
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sense in a market context, they indicate that moderate regimes are automatically preferable 446 
when the gain from subsidy is greater than the incremental loss from fewer livestock in parishes 447 
where value of livestock is low. 448 
FIGURE 4  449 
FIGURE 5 450 
Geographic comparison of parishes shows that opportunity cost of reducing stocking 451 
density and required break-even carbon price were highest in the Solway Firth, Moray Firth 452 
and Firth of Clyde regions. Lowest values occurred on parts of the west coast and offshore 453 
islands, including the Inner Hebrides and small sections of the Shetland Islands and Orkney. 454 
Incidentally, these parishes with lower break-even carbon prices overlap with sites identified 455 
by the 2016 national saltmarsh survey as being threatened from overgrazing and lacking 456 
designated protection (Haynes, 2016). Although saltmarshes are also present on the east coast 457 
(Figure 1), Figures 2-5 do not show parishes due to lack of realistic data on livestock values. 458 
4. Discussion 459 
This section reviews results for the proposition of a carbon market (5.1) and 460 
contextualises them into a potential regional PES scheme (5.2). Limits of this study are finally 461 
introduced to show the validity of our results (5.3). 462 
4.1 Viability of findings for a pure carbon market in mitigating saltmarsh grazing 463 
pressure 464 
We set out to investigate whether a pure carbon market could prompt a reduction of 465 
grazing pressure on Scottish saltmarshes by calculating net benefits of land use and break-even 466 
carbon prices to compensate revenue loss. The break-even prices were directly related to 467 
opportunity costs, such that prices were lower for cattle grazing regimes than for more valuable 468 
sheep grazing regimes, and had both negative and positive values. Negative break-even prices 469 
were calculated under certain scenarios, particularly the most favourable high to moderate 470 
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regime change, due to gains from subsidies being greater than the relatively small reduction in 471 
stocking density. This illustrates the role that agri-environment subsidies have in promoting less 472 
intense grazing management practice, and that there is no need for further compensation 473 
schemes when livestock value is low.  474 
The greatest break-even prices of £143.46 t-1 C and £102.40 t-1 C for sheep and cattle 475 
respectively (Table 6) occur when there is no effect from public subsidy, such as in moderate 476 
to low and very high to high transitions. In such a case, the carbon price needs to compensate 477 
wholly for the value of livestock lost due to reduced stocking density. With these carbon prices 478 
in the range of social costs of carbon estimated by the literature, a carbon market in such a 479 
scenario would only be possible if market prices of carbon reflected true costs of carbon. 480 
The results demonstrate the important role of subsidies and of a reduction of voluntary 481 
schemes, either due to exclusion from the Common Agricultural Policy because of Brexit or 482 
because grazing intensity is not reduced sufficiently. Under these circumstances, it would be 483 
more difficult for a pure carbon market to prompt a decrease in grazing pressure. On the other 484 
hand, if policy were rectified to recognize the importance of saltmarsh climate regulation 485 
services, either by establishing new agri-environmental schemes that farmers can apply for or 486 
by increasing the amount of money provided under the Wetland Management option, this would 487 
further drive down the required break-even carbon price. In this case, an increase in subsidiary 488 
aid could make further transitions in stocking density feasible.  489 
In our analysis of livestock values based on real parish compositions (Figures 4-5), the 490 
lowest break-even carbon price was around £-77 t-1 C. However, parishes displayed a huge 491 
variability in break-even prices, such that even in the most favourable transition from high to 492 
moderate some parishes had break-even prices around £960 t-1 C. These results illustrate that a 493 
subset of parishes could well have pure carbon markets with price of carbon in international 494 
market ranges while still managing to incentivize reductions in grazing pressure, while in other 495 
parishes this is largely unfeasible due to high value of livestock. There is some promise in that 496 
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lower break-even prices are found on the west coast and offshore islands (Figure 2), areas that 497 
are identified by Haynes (2016) as containing saltmarsh sites which lack designation and are 498 
threatened by overgrazing. These parishes then, having lower opportunity costs, will more 499 
easily elicit decreases in grazing intensity through the introduction of a PES scheme selling 500 
carbon emission reduction and other services. In the majority of parishes however, it appears 501 
rather unfeasible that a pure carbon market can provide carbon benefits at a high enough value 502 
to incentivise saltmarsh agriculturists to decrease grazing intensity. Moreover, the number of 503 
potential carbon credits that can be exchanged in this local market would be very limited and 504 
insufficient to compensate corporates emissions.  505 
4.2 Towards a voluntary carbon PES scheme  506 
There is a growing recognition that coastal agricultural landscapes provide important services 507 
other than food provision. This is not limited to the UK, but has been studied extensively 508 
worldwide (Power, 2010; Wylie et al., 2016). Moreover, although common agro-industrial 509 
practices are degrading ecological conditions and ecosystem services in the pursuit of food 510 
provision (Foley et al., 2005), VRFLHW\¶VGHPDQGDQGQHHGIRUVXSSRUWLQJand cultural services, 511 
aesthetic value and cultural identity are increasing (Reed et al., 2014). The benefit transfer 512 
analysis employed in this study indicates that adding to livestock revenue and carbon 513 
sequestration the benefits valued by Christie and Raymant (2012) significantly drives up the 514 
net benefit society can get from saltmarshes. At a WTP of £364.58 ha-1 (see section 2.3.4), the 515 
collective value of these services can compensate the negative benefits generated by a reduction 516 
of grazing as shown in the Figure 3.  517 
Notably, perceptions on the importance of saltmarsh ecosystem services are highly influenced 518 
E\SHRSOH¶Vperspective and level of education, and whether services are directly experienced 519 
and affect local livelihoods (Soy-massoni et al., 2016). This requires a specific analysis of the 520 
demand of the services more appreciated by stakeholders under different management regimes, 521 
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as occurred for peatlands (Bonn et al, 2014). The valuation of services provided by a saltmarsh 522 
site is therefore highly influenced by local perceptions and conditions. When we considered the 523 
benefit transfer of services provided by SSSI sites, we simplified this by adapting the perceived 524 
social benefit from English and Welsh saltmarshes from Christie and Rayment (2012). To have 525 
a more accurate picture, however, the next step would be to assess social perception and 526 
willingness to pay for services in our study sites from different potential buyers, focusing 527 
possibly on broad domains with similar typology of farming rather than attempting to assess 528 
values for each parish individually. 529 
To outline some possibilities, saltmarsh sites with high numbers of grazing geese may 530 
attract visitors such as bird-watchers or hunters who may be charged an entrance or hunting fee 531 
(Macmillan et al., 2004). Water or aquaculture companies benefitting from water filtration 532 
services may contribute to PES to avoid the need of artificial water filters (Locatelli et al., 2014). 533 
Communities protected from storms and waves may diverge funds otherwise needed to build 534 
hard sea defences (King and Lestert, 1995). As these examples indicate, the beneficiaries and 535 
the particular services that are valued will vary in different places and geographical contexts. 536 
Once beneficiaries and the main services demanded are identified, it is possible to figure 537 
out a specific market for saltmarshes services. Here we focus on voluntary carbon market. 538 
Compared to the compliance carbon markets developed under the Kyoto protocol, voluntary 539 
markets have more opportunities to apply to local land use projects and higher flexibility to 540 
bundle benefits. Moreover, schemes under the UN framework such as Joint Implementation, 541 
Clean Development Mechanisms and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 542 
work directly with and through national government processes and usually require a threshold 543 
of thousands of carbon credits, difficult to reach for coastal project (Wylie et al., 2016). 544 
Conversely, international voluntary standards for blue carbon projects are usually based on 545 
tailored methodologies (usually validated by Plan Vivo and Verified Carbon Standard -VCS) 546 
and prove to be easier to implement due to the higher flexibility and lower costs of the required 547 
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carbon accounting, verification and certification. VCS has so far provided general standards for 548 
land-based climate change mitigation projects. Moreover, VCS VM0024 provides GHGs 549 
assessment for coastal wetland creation, while the VM 0033 (2015) for tidal wetland restoration. 550 
Recently, adaptations to VCS standard have been proposed by Reed et al. (2013) to verify 551 
changes in GHGs fluxes resulting from peatland restoration. However, verification and 552 
accreditation remain financially feasible only for large-scale projects and big investors (Wylie 553 
et al., 2016). To overcome these difficulties, regional voluntary agreements are emerging; they 554 
may be national or more localised markets targeting local/national investors under new or 555 
adapted existing standards to tailor specifically to local restoration schemes (Kosoy and Guigon, 556 
2012). Examples for the UK are the peatland and woodland restoration projects (Forestry 557 
Commission, 2017; IUCN, 2015). An advantage of these markets is that the standards proposed 558 
are often based on VCS guidance, but use their own empirical or modelled measurement to 559 
verify carbon emission reduction: they are rigorous for local investors, but more cost effective 560 
than the VCS standard. Finally, they often target more services, not having the possibility to 561 
reach a critical threshold for only one (for example high volume of carbon credits sold).  562 
We propose in order to promote a reduction in grazing pressure a combination of private 563 
transactions and subsidiary aid to compensate for the loss in agricultural revenue. This can be 564 
seen as a renovated agro-environmental scheme as proposed by the Welsh Assembly based on 565 
spatially targeted approach to land management (Reed et al., 2014) and voluntary payments 566 
from corporates as proposed under the Peatland Code.  Payments would include a public 567 
subsidy for the reduction of grazing (to moderate or low pressure), and then, according to the 568 
cost opportunity of grazing, a variable price for carbon voluntarily paid by companies to 569 
compensate the forgone income. Differently from conventional agro-environmental schemes 570 
there is the introduction here of outcome-based (carbon regulation) payments that would also 571 
be able to provide additional benefits as those quantified for the SSSI protected saltmarshes.  572 
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Bundling carbon sequestration with other services requires identifying whether low 573 
levels of grazing conflict with other supporting, regulating, and cultural services. As already 574 
mentioned, there is good evidence that low levels of saltmarsh grazing benefits biodiversity 575 
(Adnitt et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2011). There is some evidence that nutrient cycling in coastal 576 
grasslands is maximised under ungrazed regimes (Ford et al., 2012) and that grazing slows 577 
down microbial turnover (Olsen et al., 2011), although classic theory dictates that intensive 578 
grazing promotes faster nutrient cycling than light or ungrazed regimes (Bardgett et al., 1998). 579 
Flood control is diminished with high levels of grazing as large herbivores such as cattle cause 580 
soil compaction and decrease soil infiltration rates (Carroll et al., 2004). This suggests that 581 
perhaps low levels of small herbivore grazing such as sheep may have smaller or negligible 582 
negative effects. Grazing effects on cultural services depend somewhat on the cultural aspect 583 
being valued. For example, the cultural service of environmental appreciation of forb and 584 
flower abundance have been found to be maximised under extensively grazed regimes (Ford, 585 
2012), but extensive grazing is known to decrease abundance of wading birds (Chapman, 2007). 586 
There is the need, therefore, before valuing bundled ecosystem services, for further research to 587 
identify the services that trade-off and those that complement when aiming for a lessening of 588 
grazing intensity.  589 
Other than considering co-benefits, several other aspects must be addressed to achieve 590 
a well-functioning PES scheme.  Incentives that encourage production on one service may have 591 
adverse effects on others (for example a reduction in biodiversity- Kinzing et al., 2011; Chan 592 
et al., 2017). For instance, trade-offs caused by intensity of grazing between biodiversity (Ford 593 
et al., 2012; Sharps et al., 2016), fruition of the saltmarshes (van Zenten et al., 2016) and 594 
appreciation of the landscape and tourist attraction (Ryan 2011) are documented. Incentives 595 
might drive also the displacement of activities (leakage) damaging environmental service 596 
provision to areas outside the geographical zone of PES intervention (Engel et al., 2008); and 597 
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finally incentives might induce the argument that polluters must be paid for conservation 598 
reducing intrinsic or altruistic motivations (Chan et al., 2017).  599 
Success of PES initiatives is then reliant upon filling the gap between management 600 
aspects and scientific knowledge of the ecosystem services (Kinzig et al., 2011) and the need 601 
to establish standards, develop tools, metrics and methods to reduce transaction costs (Naeem 602 
et al., 2015). Here we want to address some of these issues, focusing attention on, (i) 603 
additionality, (ii) how to ensure permanence by reducing external stressors, and (iii) monitoring. 604 
Under (i) it is necessary to show that the project would not occur without private investments. 605 
This would be applicable in those areas where there is not yet established legal protection (for 606 
example the Outer Hebrides); where protection under the EU Habitat Directive is in force, but 607 
significant grazing pressure and physical degraded soil is evident (Reed et al., 2014); or, in case 608 
of legal test fulfilled, where companies are able to significantly support public subsidies. The 609 
contribution from private sponsors can be decided in the rules of the market and must not 610 
necessarily be a high amount (for example in the case of the Peatland Code this is set at 15% 611 
of project cost-Reed et al., 2013). According to the results reported in Figures 4 and 5, many 612 
saltmarshes in the Highlands and Outer Hebrides could be supported towards a transition to a 613 
low grazing regime with a carbon price within 100 t-1C. Although this price is far from being a 614 
private market price, but close to the social cost of carbon, this is equivalent to £ 40 ha-1 for 615 
each ton of carbon emission reduced, an amount which small companies can invest to raise 616 
social responsibility. For those areas characterised by higher opportunity costs (see Figures 4 617 
and 5), where the break-even carbon price is set at £500-1,000 t-1C, this can be translated in a 618 
support of £ 200-400 ha-1, an amount that can be exchanged by involving bigger companies, 619 
trusts, NGOs and more support from public bodies.  620 
PES must account for risks to permanence (point ii), and in particular natural risks 621 
caused by climate change and different patterns of erosion that might reduce the area dedicate 622 
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to grazing. A series of strategies must be adopted to minimise these risks, from the evaluation 623 
of exposure and vulnerability of saltmarshes to external stressors, to their mitigations provided 624 
by a larger scale of participants; from the formulation of landscape-scale PES schemes to the 625 
promotion of financial instruments such as insurance or PES credit buffers to replace or make 626 
alternative payments for a failed project (Friess et al., 2015). Other forms of risks are internal 627 
to the project management such as lack of sufficient funds to meet the opportunity costs of 628 
reduced grazing or reversal to higher intensive use in habitats outside the area of intervention. 629 
This is one of the seven concerns raised by Chan et al (2017) upon a PES scheme, where any 630 
new markets or system of incentives creates new externalities. However, there is building 631 
evidence that the latter can be addressed by promoting the roles of farmers as stewards of the 632 
countryside, and rewarding patterns of behaviour (Newtown, 2011) rather than environmental 633 
outcomes. This could facilitate the attestation of long-term commitments to reduced  grazing 634 
effort that subsides paying the full economic costs cannot address, contrarily to what is assumed 635 
by mainstream economics (Goldman-Benner et al., 2012; Wunder, 2013; Ferrraro and Kiss, 636 
2002). An alternative externality to a PES applied to saltmarsh grazing is the relocation of 637 
grazing from natural pasture to stable production, removing the benefits of methane emissions 638 
reduction from reducing ruminant. The additionality of this service, at least internally to the 639 
country, can be guaranteed under a national cap system (quotas) that reduces the total number 640 
of herds. However, it seems impossible to guarantee additionality if the reduction of grazing in 641 
the UK is compensated by an equivalent increase in another country.  642 
Finally, to guarantee cost-effective monitoring of GHGs emissions reduction (point iii), 643 
it is essential to develop a protocol that facilitates indirect valuation of GHGs to reduce the 644 
costs of direct measurements or process-based computational models (Bonn et al., 2014), 645 
expected to be relevant in those contexts (such as saltmarsh habitats) where carbon emissions 646 
show high variability over space and time. Proxy variables can be specifically developed for 647 
GHGs emissions and tailored to the regional context as proposed for the valuation of carbon 648 
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emissions change of aquatic restored habitats4. For our  specific case, it is possible to propose 649 
an empirical model fitting data from UK studies on management of saltmarshes, 650 
biogeochemical parameters (water table level, soil moisture, soil temperature, etc.), and 651 
ecological gradients (species composition).  652 
The above three points align the saltmarsh PES scheme to the recent PES description 653 
suggested by Wunder (2015) as a voluntary agreement between service users and providers 654 
showing the property to generate outputs conditional on agreed rules; to provide monitoring by 655 
simple tools (reckoner) at reasonable transaction costs; and to look to effects offsite the market 656 
intervention taking into account and tackling environmental externalities.  657 
A final consideration is about the importance of valuation to establish a PES. Although 658 
valuation is not always needed to create a market (Vatn, 2010), a potential cause of PES failure 659 
could be due to the difficulties associated with the agreement of prices of the services to be 660 
exchanged. A sound valuation of ecosystem services, under deliberated approach (Spash, 2008; 661 
Kenter et al., 2017) or reverse auction (Stoneham et al., 2003), could facilitate agreement 662 
between the parties, reducing transaction costs, and providing fair prices (usually lower than 663 
those paid in a fixed-price system) that reflect cost of management in a context of intrinsic 664 
motivation (Chan et al., 2017). Valuation is not relevant also when trading is not the mechanism 665 
chosen to carry out a transaction of ecosystem services (Wunder, 2015). This is true for the 666 
Peatland Code (Reed et al., 2013) and the PES scheme proposed in this paper, where private 667 
financial transactions are supposed to be made by corporates for enhancing social responsibility 668 
rather than trading carbon credits for offsetting CO2 emissions. Moreover, in the case of 669 
saltmarshes, where the ecosystem provides a wide range of services that can vary across space 670 
and time, it is often difficult and time- and resource-consuming to provide accurate valuations 671 
                                                 
4
 Examples of rapid reckoners for GHG emissions are under development for coastal wetland in the US. 
https://www.mass.gov/blue-carbon-calculator 
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and to disentangle one service from another (Environment Bank, 2015). Because of this 672 
difficulty, the Deben Estuary PES scheme has opted for the cost of saltmarsh restoration rather 673 
than valuation of saltmarsh services (Environment Bank, 2015). The Peatland Code allows also 674 
companies to sponsor emissions reductions with prices reflecting costs of restoring degraded 675 
peatland, the costs differing depending on how degraded the habitat is (IUCN, 2015).  676 
In the case of the peatland scheme, companies can receive deferred indirect economic 677 
benefits by improving corporate social responsibility rather than direct financial benefits. In our 678 
case study, where we explore changes in land use in the form of grazing management rather 679 
than saltmarsh restoration through managed realignment or other practices, there are no 680 
equivalent costs of restoration. However, if it can be established that the summative value of 681 
services provided is higher for lightly grazed than for more intensively grazed saltmarsh, the 682 
price of the payment could reflect the opportunity cost of reducing grazing. The values in 683 
Figures 4 and 5 give the amount of money required to compensate a transition from high to low 684 
and high to moderate stocking density, respectively. As long as a combination of subsidies and 685 
PES provide that amount, it does not necessarily matter what proportion of the amount is from 686 
the value of carbon sequestration versus from other services. In a way, this is comparable to 687 
prices reflecting restoration costs in peatland projects. 688 
4.3 Assumptions and limitations 689 
It is important to highlight that the results given here are highly dependent on a series 690 
of assumptions introduced to simplify complex real-world grazing practices into a format that 691 
could apply more generally to typical saltmarshes. The reason why a transition from high to 692 
moderate and low stocking density was feasible is because we assumed sites stocked at a density 693 
< 0.6 LU ha-1 yr-1 can obtain financial support from the Wetland Management agri-environment 694 
option. It may be argued that such an assumption is precarious, especially since grazer type, 695 
local conditions and seasonal variation determine whether a particular grazing intensity is 696 
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harmful for biodiversity at a particular site. We could not obtain the average stocking density 697 
of sites currently managed under this option due to an absence of data. However, even with this 698 
assumption the underlying logic for the trends we observe and discuss holds true. Essentially, 699 
if a decrease in grazing pressure is sufficient to allow farmers to claim subsidies, this drives 700 
down the required carbon price to a value that might guarantee private voluntary payments able 701 
to compensate forgone income and guarantee a bundle of benefits. The specific value of this 702 
carbon price will depend on local conditions (opportunity cost in each parish) and on the degree 703 
to which grazing intensity is reduced.  704 
Net benefits from reduced grazing in the model are influenced by reduction in methane 705 
emissions from ruminants and results hold (e.g. can be considered additional) assuming that 706 
relocation of the reduced herds from the field to stable is avoided.  707 
We assume the full ecosystem services of SSSI protected sites are provided by sites 708 
grazed under low grazing regimes, even if these sites are not currently under SSSI designation. 709 
We did this to obtain an approximation of the social benefit that saltmarsh sites provide, but 710 
future work will have to investigate how the value of services differs between protected and 711 
non-protected sites. We also assume that the value of livestock grazed on saltmarsh is 712 
equivalent to national average livestock values. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that 713 
the enforcement of any stocking density on a saltmarsh site can be more effective in either 714 
privately owned land or saltmarsh with clear fenced designations. PES is not intended as a silver 715 
bullet that can address any environmental problem. Where it is missing the authority to manage 716 
ecosystems, a prior condition to the success of PES is to enforce property rights (Engel et al., 717 
2008). Sites where any agriculturist can freely graze their livestock cannot receive PES unless 718 
there is a record of total grazing pressure over the year. 719 
There are some limitations to the grazing effect on carbon sequestration we adapted 720 
from a study of English and Welsh saltmarshes (Kingham, 2013). The reduction in aboveground 721 
vegetation due to grazing (for further detail see section 2.2) was a single effect without a 722 
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confidence interval or probability distribution, preventing us from using a statistical approach. 723 
Saltmarshes in the UK are classified into four bio-geographical regions with distinct vegetation 724 
communities: western, south-eastern, western Scottish and eastern Scottish (Adam, 1990). The 725 
effect of grazing on Scottish saltmarsh may therefore differ slightly from the effects observed 726 
in the English and Welsh region. As there is currently no study which has explored this for 727 
Scotland specifically, there is a need for further research in this regard. Such a study must 728 
consider effects on both aboveground and belowground stores, considering soil carbon in 729 
coastal ecosystems is a very important component of blue carbon accounting (Pendleton et al., 730 
2012). The subsequent model of grazing effects should then be validated with on the ground 731 
collection of primary data. Further socio-economic research, for example via use of 732 
questionnaires, could be used to validate the assumptions proposed by the model in the regions 733 
that show promise in incorporating alternative financing schemes. 734 
 735 
5. Conclusions 736 
This study has proposed for the first time the possibility to introduce a PES scheme to 737 
support the provision of ecosystem services provided by saltmarshes under reduced intensive 738 
agricultural use. In particular, it has focuses on three major aspects: 1)  the quantification of the 739 
impact that carbon price have on addressing the change in grazing regime; 2) the impact of the 740 
provision of other public services on the possibility to reduce livestock grazing ; and 3) 741 
considerations to be addressed  to implement a sub-national scale  PES for saltmarshes.  742 
This study, then, other than describing the economics behind the possibility to reduce grazing 743 
pressure in saltmarshes, contributes to the growing body of work investigating the creation of 744 
new markets to enable private investments in ecosystem services provision. Across the globe, 745 
various management tools using an ecosystem services framework are being used for the 746 
purposes of conservation and sustainable resource use, including marine spatial planning, 747 
ecosystem-based management, and integrated coastal zone management (Granek et al., 2009; 748 
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Post and Lundin, 1996). As a part of this toolset, Payments for Ecosystem Services provide an 749 
incentive-based mechanism promoting nature conservation (Lau, 2013). Blue carbon initiatives 750 
are becoming common under the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism, whereby 751 
climate mitigation projects are carried out in developing countries (Palmer and Silber, 2012). 752 
Blue carbon restoration projects of mangrove, seagrass and saltmarsh habitats in countries such 753 
as Kenya, Vietnam, Madagascar and India help alleviate poverty, finance conservation, and 754 
ensure the continuing provision of climate mitigation services (Hejnowicz et al., 2015; Lau, 755 
2013; Wylie et al., 2016). While our study focused on saltmarsh grazing in Scotland, the 756 
management of saltmarsh grazers for carbon sequestration purposes could be investigated in 757 
other countries using the same approach, both developing and developed, for blue carbon 758 
initiatives.  759 
While there is currently a Peatland Code and Woodland Code for carbon payments 760 
towards habitat restoration in the UK, our study provides some initial information that may help 761 
contribute to the establishment of a Saltmarsh Code. To date, PES schemes have largely ignored 762 
saltmarshes, despite their suitability given the variety of ecosystem services they provide. We 763 
investigated one aspect of a potential saltmarsh PES scheme, involving managing livestock 764 
stocking density and the provision of carbon benefits in exchange for lessening grazing pressure. 765 
Where only the change in climate regulation service is considered, the price of carbon required 766 
to compensate a decrease in grazing is higher than can be expected in voluntary carbon markets. 767 
However, it is possible that regional markets specifically tailored for saltmarshes could 768 
establish much higher prices (this must be explored studying the demand for saltmarshes 769 
services) or that common voluntary carbon prices can be driven down by the addition of agri-770 
environment subsidies and by bundling payments of other ecosystem services. Finally, 771 
converting break-even price of a ton of carbon to costs per hectare when grazing is reduced 772 
from 1 to 0.6 LU ha-1 shows to be a not so high cost, especially in those areas characterised by 773 
a limited opportunity cost such as Western Scotland, and some internal uplands areas of the 774 
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Highlands and the Hebrides. Notwithstanding the possibility to address some interventions in 775 
these rural areas, the area affected and consequently the herd number is limited. 776 
 Under the scenario of grazing reduction from 1 to 0.6 LU ha-1 we expect to have a 777 
reduction of 9,260 heads of which 51% cattle (4,759 units) and 49% sheep (4,501 units). These 778 
reduced cattle units correspond only to 1.3% of the total production in the 174 parishes where 779 
saltmarshes are present, and to 0.26% of the entire Scottish production. Moreover, the reduction 780 
in sheep is 0.35% of the production in the 174 parishes where saltmarshes are present and 781 
0.067% of the global Scottish production. Although it is not aim of this research to quantify the 782 
economic impact on the agricultural sector, considering the very small reduction in livestock 783 
units, it is unlikely that these figures will have a relevant impact on trade balance, negative 784 
effect on food security and distortion on prices. Conversely, the rewards by public subsidies 785 
and private incentives can help sustain income and reduce pressure on a sensitive habitat 786 
favouring the production of environmental benefits and contributing to provide a new role to 787 
farmers as local stewards of nature rather than mere producers of market commodities. 788 
In its early stages, the PES saltmarsh market is unlikely to function as a formal carbon 789 
offsetting tool. Instead, it allows third parties to demonstrate corporate and public social 790 
responsibility and to benefit from services which could lessen costs of, for example, water 791 
filtration or sea defences. As saltmarsh carbon projects become more common, they may more 792 
easily gain verification and accreditation, to name one example with the Verified Carbon 793 
Standard (VCS, 2017), allowing the transfer of carbon emission reduction credits in an 794 
emissions trading scheme. The Woodland Code started in a similar fashion and now allows 795 
projects to generate tradable carbon, while the Peatland Code is on its way to this stage (IUCN, 796 
2015). In this way, although a pure carbon market appears unfeasible, a premium carbon market 797 
offering bundled ecosystem services may help reduce grazing pressure on Scottish saltmarshes, 798 
thereby providing globally important climate regulation services and at the same time protecting 799 
sensitive habitats. 800 
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Table 1 &DUERQEHQHILWVORVWXQGHUDUDQJHRIPDUNHWSULFHVŇ Value of carbon emission 810 
avoided from 2015-2045 from 1 ha of saltmarsh when grazing is reduced by  1 LU ha-1 (high 811 
grazing regime) using a range of market carbon prices. Benefits for low, moderate, and very 812 
high regimes are calculated by multiplying values reported in Table 1 by respective stocking 813 
densities. 814 
 815 
Discount rate 
(%) 
Carbon price 
(£ t-1 C) 
Carbon benefits of 
sheep grazing (£) 
Carbon benefits of 
cattle grazing (£) 
3 1 29.91 33.93 
 
2 59.83 67.86 
 
5 149.56 169.66 
 
10 299.13 339.31 
5 1 23.77 26.97 
 
2 47.55 53.93 
 
5 118.87 134.84 
 
10 237.74 269.67 
10 1 15.14 17.17 
 
2 30.28 34.35 
 
5 75.70 85.87 
 
10 151.40 171.74 
15 1 10.99 12.46 
 
2 21.97 24.92 
 
5 54.93 62.31 
 
10 109.86 124.62 
 816 
 817 
Table 2 &DUERQEHQHILWVORVWXQGHUDUDQJHRIVRFLDOFRVWVRIFDUERQŇValue of carbon 818 
emission avoided from 2015-2045 from 1 ha of saltmarsh when grazing is reduced by  1 LU 819 
ha-1 (high grazing regime) using a range of social costs of carbon. Benefits for low, moderate, 820 
and very high regimes are calculated by multiplying values reported in Table 2 by respective 821 
stocking densities. Carbon prices and discount rate are from Nordhaus (2017); Tol (2009); 822 
van den Bergh and Botzen (2014). 823 
 824 
Discount rate 
(%) 
Carbon price 
(£ t-1 C) 
Carbon benefits of 
sheep grazing (£) 
Carbon benefits of 
cattle grazing (£) 
5 8.04 191 217 
3 23.38 699 793 
2.5 37.26 1,187 1,346 
3 65.76 1,967 2,231 
 825 
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 826 
Table 3 2SSRUWXQLW\FRVWVRIFKDQJLQJJUD]LQJUHJLPHVZLWKPDUNHWFDUERQSULFHVŇ 827 
Change in net benefits (in GBP) over 30 years caused by a change in sheep and cattle grazing 828 
regimes. Positive values in bold indicate gains in net benefit.  829 
Sheep 
  Change in grazing regime 
Discount 
rate (%) 
Carbon price 
(£ t-1 C)  
moderate high very high high very high very high 
to to to to to to 
low low low moderate moderate high 
3 1 -1,279 -1,129 -5,390 150 -4,112 -4,262 
 2 -1,270 -1,108 -5,340 162 -4,070 -4,232 
 5 -1,243 -1,045 -5,187 198 -3,944 -4,142 
 10 -1,198 -940 -4,933 258 -3,735 -3,993 
5 1 -1,016 -897 -4,284 119 -3,268 -3,387 
 2 -1,009 -880 -4,244 129 -3,235 -3,363 
 5 -988 -830 -4,122 157 -3,135 -3,292 
 10 -952 -747 -3,920 205 -2,968 -3,173 
10 1 -647 -571 -2,728 76 -2,081 -2,157 
 2 -643 -561 -2,703 82 -2,060 -2,142 
 5 -629 -529 -2,625 100 -1,996 -2,097 
 10 -606 -476 -2,497 130 -1,890 -2,021 
15 1 -470 -414 -1,980 55 -1,510 -1,565 
 2 -466 -407 -1,961 59 -1,495 -1,554 
 5 -456 -384 -1,905 73 -1,449 -1,521 
 10 -440 -345 -1,812 95 -1,372 -1,466 
Cattle 
3 
  
1 -1,032 -554 -3,994 478 -2,962 -3,441 
2 -1,022 -530 -3,937 492 -2,915 -3,407 
5 -991 -459 -3,764 533 -2,772 -3,305 
10 -941 -340 -3,475 601 -2,535 -3,135 
5 
  
1 -820 -440 -3,174 380 -2,354 -2,734 
2 -812 -421 -3,129 391 -2,316 -2,707 
5 -788 -365 -2,991 423 -2,203 -2,627 
10 -748 -270 -2,762 477 -2,014 -2,492 
35 
 
10 
  
1 -522 -280 -2,022 242 -1,499 -1,741 
2 -517 -268 -1,992 249 -1,475 -1,724 
5 -502 -232 -1,905 270 -1,403 -1,673 
10 -476 -172 -1,759 304 -1,283 -1,587 
15 
  
1 -379 -203 -1,467 176 -1,088 -1,264 
2 -375 -195 -1,446 181 -1,070 -1,251 
5 -364 -168 -1,382 196 -1,018 -1,214 
10 -345 -125 -1,276 221 -931 -1,151 
 830 
  831 
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 832 
Table 4 &KDQJHLQQHWVRFLDOEHQHILWRIJUD]LQJUHJLPHVŇChange in net benefits (in GBP) 833 
over 30 years when sheep and cattle grazing regimes are changed using social costs of carbon. 834 
For each livestock type, scenarios without additional service valuation and with SSSI valuation 835 
from Christie and Rayment (2012) are presented.  836 
  Change in grazing regime 
Discount 
rate (%) 
Carbon price 
(£ t-1 C)  
moderate high very high high very high very high 
to to to to to to 
low low low moderate moderate high 
Sheep 
without SSSI valuation       
5 8.04 -966 -780 -4,000 186 -3,034 -3,220 
3 23.38 -1,078 -660 -4,252 418 -3,175 -3,592 
2.5 37.26 -1,015 -393 -3,775 622 -2,761 -3,382 
3 65.76 -697 227 -2,097 925 -1,400 -2,325 
with SSSI valuation 
 
      
5 8.04 5,003 5,189 1,969 186 -3,034 -3,220 
3 23.38 6,433 6,851 3,258 418 -3,175 -3,592 
2.5 37.26 6,981 7,602 4,220 622 -2,761 -3,382 
3 65.76 6,813 7,738 5,413 925 -1,400 -2,325 
Cattle 
without SSSI valuation 
      
5 8.04 -763 -307 -2,852 456 -2,088 -2,545 
3 23.38 -804 -22 -2,703 782 -1,899 -2,681 
2.5 37.26 -706 327 -2,025 1,033 -1,319 -2,353 
3 65.76 -373 984 -259 1,357 114 -1,243 
with SSSI valuation 
       
5 8.04 5,206 5,662 3,117 456 -2,088 -2,545 
3 23.38 6,706 7,488 4,807 782 -1,899 -2,681 
2.5 37.26 7,290 8,323 5,970 1,033 -1,319 -2,353 
3 65.76 7,138 8,495 7,252 1,357 114 -1,243 
 837 
 838 
 839 
 840 
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Table 5 2SSRUWXQLW\FRVWRIOLYHVWRFNŇ The value lost every year in agricultural revenue 841 
under a transition from high to moderate stocking density. 842 
 843 
Discount rate 
(%) 
£ lost per year 
Sheep Cattle 
3 57.22 46.33 
5 45.48 36.82 
10 28.96 23.45 
15 21.02 17.01 
 844 
 845 
 846 
 847 
 848 
Table 6 Break-HYHQFDUERQSULFHVWRRIIVHWRSSRUWXQLW\FRVWVŇ Required prices of carbon 849 
(£ t-1 C) to offset the opportunity cost of having reduced livestock. At these carbon prices 850 
farmers would not lose any money changing from one grazing regime to the next. At any 851 
higher prices farmers would gain money by reducing grazing pressure. 852 
 853 
 Change in grazing regime 
  
moderate 
to 
low 
high 
to 
low 
very high 
to 
low 
high 
to 
moderate 
very high 
to 
moderate 
very high 
to 
high 
Sheep 143.46 54.90 107.00 -11.53 99.18 143.46 
       
Cattle 102.40 24.31 70.24 -34.26 63.35 102.40 
 854 
 855 
 856 
 857 
 858 
 859 
 860 
 861 
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 862 
 863 
)LJXUH  6FRWWLVK VDOWPDUVK GLVWULEXWLRQŇ Map of 249 saltmarsh sites and 174 parishes 864 
containing saltmarsh across Scotland. West coast sites are smaller but more numerous than east 865 
coast sites. Sites marked red indicate overgrazed saltmarshes (Haynes, 2016). 866 
 867 
  868 
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Figure 2. Change in benefits from high to low regime transitionsŇ Map indicating the 869 
change in net benefit over 30 years arising from a transition from high to low grazing regime 870 
with a carbon price of £1 per t C at 5% discount rate.  871 
 872 
  873 
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Figure 3. Change in benefits from high to moderate regime transitionsŇ Map indicating 874 
the change in net benefit over 30 years arising from a transition from high to low grazing regime 875 
with a carbon price of £1 per t C at 5% discount rate.  876 
   877 
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Figure 4. Break-even carbon prices for high to low regime transitionsŇ Map indicating the 878 
required price of carbon to compensate for loss in agricultural revenue for a transition from 879 
high to low grazing regimes. 880 
  881 
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Figure 5. Break-even carbon prices for high to moderate regime transitionsŇ Map 882 
indicating the required price of carbon to compensate for loss in agricultural revenue for a 883 
transition from high to moderate grazing regimes.  884 
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 908 
Figure S1. Change in benefits from high to low regime transitionsŇ Map indicating the 909 
change in net benefit over 30 years arising from a transition from high to low grazing regime 910 
with a carbon price of £10 per t C at 5% discount rate.  911 
  912 
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Figure S2. Change in benefits from high to moderate regime transitionsŇ Map indicating 913 
the change in net benefit over 30 years arising from a transition from high to moderate grazing 914 
regime with a carbon price of £10 per t C at 5% discount rate.  915 
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